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Classification  and  periodization,  by  which  we  label  spans  of  time,  guide  our 
understanding of history.  In the course of mankind’s history, criteria for these periods 
include names derived from simple time‐based numbering, ruling elites or figureheads, 
cultural developments, or technological advancement.    In  forming mental maps of the 
human story, symbolism plays an integral role, and ages come to be known by societies’ 
progress,  stagnation,  achievements,  as well  as  failures.    Large‐scale  projects  occupy  a 
unique  position  in  the  study  of  history.    Grandiose  plans  stand  as  symbolic 
representations  of  both  cultural  and  political  thought.  Great  undertakings  provide 







and  concurrent  development  of  river  systems  in  the  Southeast  overseen  by  the 
Tennessee  Valley  Authority  (TVA),  beginning  in  the  1930s.    The  Panama  Canal  is 
indicative of  the  time period, which  saw  the United States  flexing diplomatic muscles, 





into  account,  of  what  importance  are  failed  or  rejected  proposals  to  the  greater 
narrative  of  history?    Without  careful  preservation  of  documents  and  texts,  these 











The  piqued  interest  of  the  international  press  was  not  lost  on  Sörgel,  who  included 
extracts  from  well‐known  newspapers  inside  the  front  cover  of  his  Sammlung 
(collection),1 Mittelmeer‐Senkung; Sahara‐Bewässerung (Panropa Projekt) (Sörgel 1929, 
3).  Said the New York Times; “It is the ‘reawakening of the Sahara’ through fructification 
by  the  Mediterranean’s  waters,  that  gives  to  the  German  engineer’s  project  its 








  internacional  europea, una  idea, que con ayuda de  la  téchnica diera amplia base para 
  une  nueva  vida  de  los  pueblos:  no  se  podría  entonces  evitar  el  inminente  peligro  de 
  naufragio  de  nuestra  cultura,  no  se  podría  con  ello  iniciar  y  dejar  establecido  un 
  conjunto cultural completamente nuevo?2 (3).   



















planet  by  damming  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar  and  lowering  the  Mediterranean  Sea.  
Despite  nearly  a  century  of  technological  advancement,  engineering  on  such  a 
gargantuan  scale  as  Atlantropa  is  unparalleled  and  unlikely  in  the  foreseeable  future.  




of  the  project.    A  unique  perspective  of  the  Inter‐War  and  post  World  War  II  time 
periods may be gained through the lens of this megaproject and the rationale behind its 
inception.  Historian Jeffrey Herf coined the term “reactionary modernism” in his 1984 
work of  the  same name  to  refer  to  the  paradoxical nature  in which  some post‐World 
War  I  German  intellectuals  simultaneously  rejected  rationalistic  ideals  of  the 
Enlightenment. The philosophers were  in  favor  of a more Romantic nationalism while 
accepting  technological  advances  born  out  of  that  same enlightened,  liberal  thinking. 
Irrationalist  ideology  combined  with  modern  technology  led  to  the  devastating 
philosophy of  the National  Socialist  regime  (Herf 1‐2),  and also  contributed heavily  to 
Sörgel’s motives.3   




  One  proponent  of  this  “highly  technological  romanticism”  (2)  was  Oswald 
























lay  in the sheer size of  its population and the wealth of  resources.   Sörgel  feared that 
Europe’s  shortsighted  political  interests  diverted  attention  away  from  America  and 
Japan, who were wresting the last markets of the world out of European hands (Sörgel 
1929, 38).  He saw the solution to both of these threats in technological innovation and 
a  strong alliance amongst  the constituent  states of  Europe and  their African colonies.  




  The  idea  of  Atlantropa  spanned  four  decades.    Sörgel  enunciated most  of  the 
technical aspects by 1932.  He then keenly adapted the rhetoric in which he presented 
the  megaproject  to  suit  the  shifting  political  situation  in  Europe,  though  the  project 
itself  remained  largely  the  same.    This  megaproject  reflected  cultural  pessimism  and 
optimism in the Interbellum Weimar Republic, the vivacity of technological progress, as 
well  as  imperialistic  ambitions  of  both  Germany  and  other  European  nations.  
Atlantropa  is  an  amalgam of  early  twentieth  century  history –  not  entirely  utopian  in 
nature, and not representative of any one particular trend of thought.  The purpose of 
this study is to examine socio‐political ideology and dogma between the First World War 
until shortly after World War  II  through the  lens of the Atlantropa project.   The study 
makes  use  of  original  publications  from  Herman  Sörgel  and  the  analysis  of  two 
Atlantropa  experts,  Alexander  Gall  and  Wolfgang  Voigt.    These  works  detail  the 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technical,  economic,  and  social  aspects  of  Atlantropa.    The  historical  cultural 
investigation  of  Oswald  Spengler  by  Jeffrey  Herf  contributes  an  important  historical 
context to Sörgel’s world.  Finally, Dina Brandt’s exploration of German science fiction of 







representative  in  Bavaria,  who  served  as  an  inspiration  for  his  son.    His  father  and 
mother were elevated to noble status in the Kingdom of Bavaria, but this distinction was 
not hereditary.   Though Herman followed his  father’s  footsteps, he never attained the 
same  level of  recognition bestowed upon his  father  (Voigt 15).   A desire  to  reach  the 
same status of his parents may have informed much of Sörgel’s though processes with 
regard to his own project.   
  Sörgel  wrote  in  the  foreword  to  his  1932  publication Atlantropa  that  he  first 
decided to make the project his life’s work during Christmas 1927.  Within two years, he 
had made great strides in refining what was, at first, merely a pipe dream.  The necessity 
of  cooperation among experts  from varying  fields  required  to allow  for any  successful 
development of his  idea was  immediately clear to him  (Sörgel 1932, V).    It was  in this 
spirit  that  Sörgel  published  a  summarized  collection  of  various  articles  that  he  had 
written about the Mediterranean project in 1929.  He declared in his foreword,  







With  these  words,  Sörgel  plainly  stated  goals  that  would  become  a  decades‐long 












  Dr.  Otto  Jessen,  a  prolific  professor  of  geography  at  the  time,  made  two 
expeditions  to  the  Strait  of Gibraltar  in  1922  and  1924,  and  the  results  of  his  studies 
inspired  and  lent  credibility  to  the  feasibility  of  damming  the Mediterranean.    Jessen 
found  that,  despite  its  size  and  position,  the Mediterranean  Sea  could  not  survive  in 
current  form.    The  primary  vein  of  nourishment,  through  which  this  sea  receives  its 
”Blut“  (lifeblood),  is  the  Strait  of Gibraltar.    Jessen  added  that,  the  ocean  floor  in  the 
strait  only  needed  to  be  raised  one  hundred meters  in  order  to  produce  the  desired 




other  tributaries  range  around  2,230  cubic  kilometers  annually.    With  a  total 
evaporation surface of ~2,511,000 square kilometers and an average yearly evaporation 
of  165  centimeters  from  this  surface,  Sörgel  calculated  an  evaporation  of  4,144  cubic 
kilometers per year.  In his words, “Das Mittelmeer ist ein Verdunstungsmeer.”4 (Sörgel 
1929,  8).  The  quantitative  research  of  Jessen  and  others  provided  Sörgel  with  great 
inspiration.   
  A  dam  along  the  Strait  of  Gibraltar  would  not  only  provide  immense 
hydroelectric profit for both Europe and Africa, but also would allow for the lowering of 
the Mediterranean water  level,  exposing huge  tracts of  “Neuland”  (reclaimed  land)  to 





in  so  doing  prevent  Europe  from  self‐destruction  caused  by  rampant  overpopulation 
(Sörgel  1932,  9‐10).    In  order  to  develop Northern Africa  and  the  Sahara  regions  into 
usable  farmland,  an  enormous  quantity  of  waterpower  or  “weiße  Kohle”6  would  be 
required.    The Gibraltar  dam would provide electrical  power, and,  by accelerating  the 
sinking of  the  sea via artificial  pumping,  the Sahara  could  be  irrigated.   Only with  the 
complementary cultivation of land does the project become economical, argued Sörgel 
– the two goals are one and the same (Sörgel 1929, 12).   
  At the outset, Sörgel’s plan was to sink the  level of  the Mediterranean by four 
hundred  to  five  hundred  meters  through  a  series  of  dams  at  Gibraltar,  each  one 
hundred  meters  lower  than  the  previous.    Due  to  concerns  for  maritime  traffic, 
however,  Sörgel  and  his  colleagues  decided  that  a  lowering  of  one  hundred  to  two 
hundred meters would be sufficient (11‐14).   
  The  raising  of  a  dam  at  Gibraltar  was,  without  doubt,  the  most  technically 
demanding  part  of  Sörgel’s  plan,  requiring  the most  time  and  effort  (22).    Instead  of 
constructing a dam at the narrowest point in the Strait of Gibraltar, a distance of around 
fourteen kilometers, Sörgel decided that a more satisfactory  location  lay slightly west, 
toward  the Atlantic.   Here one  finds  the  shallowest average depths, with  the deepest 



















they would  be placed  in  the  desired position and  then  sunk accordingly.    In  the early 
phases  of  planning,  Sörgel  estimated  that  the  dam  would  comprise  some 
10,000,000,000 cubic meters of material (Sörgel 1929, 22).   
  In Atlantropa, published  in 1932, Sörgel outlined the development of the plans 
for  the  Gibraltar  dam  in  phases,  though  he  did  not  elaborate  on  as  many  smaller 
technicalities and measurements as in his 1929 publication.   The first phase dealt with 
the  development  of  the main  dam  at  Gibraltar,  described  earlier.    The  second  phase 
implemented power plants and canals on either side of the dam based on detailed maps 
of  the  ocean  floor.    Due  to  the  mountainous  nature  of  the  banks,  the  third  step 
necessitated  a  stretching  of  these  power  plants  over  ten  kilometers.    In  the  fourth 
phase,  the  power‐producing  turbines  were  relocated  to  the  European  side  and  the 
overflow cascades moved to the African side. Bruno Siegwarts, a colleague of Sörgel’s, 







construction  of  the  dam was made,  and  the width  then  estimated  to  be  around  two 
kilometers,  including  the  levee  dam.    In  the  seventh  and  final  stage  published  in  the 
1932 work, a single, larger lock replaced the graduated locks on the northern side of the 
dam –  an  idea  introduced  by  Professor  Peter  Behrens  of  the Wiener Akademie.  Also, 















  The  Black  Sea was  another  concern  that  Sörgel  had  to  address,  because  of  its 
characterization  as  an  Überflutungsmeer,7  discharging  most  of  its  water  into  the 
Mediterranean  (27).    In  order  to  preserve  the  coastline  of  this  sea,  Sörgel  proposed 




meter  drop  in  water  level  would  not  affect  navigation  in  this  particular  area.    The 
hydroelectric dam would also add to the already powerful new electricity network (27‐
29).   
  Sörgel  noted  several  other  important  locations  for  the  construction  of  other 
hydroelectric projects and canals.  He envisioned smaller dams on the Rhone and Ebro, 
as well as a complex system for the nearly depleted Adriatic Sea (34‐38).  Included in his 




be  completed  near  Tunis  and Messina.    The work  on  a  dam between  Tunis  and  Sicily 
could not begin, however, until the water level of the Mediterranean had sunk at least 







will surely be more developed” (32‐33).   Basic  ideas for the Tunis dam were given –  it 
would be built at the shallowest point in the newly formed “Strait of Sicily,” and it would 
only  need  to  be  around  one  kilometer  wide.    No  extra  levee  would  be  necessary 
because of its location within the Mediterranean.  This dam would extend some sixty‐six 
kilometers,  a  facet given  little attention by Sörgel – most  likely because of his abiding 
faith  in  forthcoming  technology.    This  point  would  serve  as  a  third  axis  for  travel 







the  retreating waters  (Sörgel 1929, 32).    This would be  the case of many cities  in  the 
western  basin,  such  as  Marseille  and  Genoa  (Sörgel  1932,  51‐54).    Other  cities  like 
Venice would require a more complex approach.  At first, Sörgel considered Venice and 

























of  the  Earth.    Coal  and  oil  undoubtedly  played  the  most  important  roles  in  energy 
production in his time, though it was clear that these were finite sources of energy.  By 
way  of  example,  Sörgel  estimated  that  reserves  of  coal  in  England  would  last  only 
another two hundred years, and those of Germany only a possibly three hundred fifty.  
America’s abundant reserves could not be counted upon as a source of energy without 
sacrificing  European  autonomy  (Sörgel  1932,  76).    Seeking  to  become  a  world‐class 
engineer like his father, Sörgel turned to the Mediterranean as the solution to Europe’s 
energy problems, saying “There  is no other sufficient source for Europe’s  future other 
than  the Mediterranean”  (Sörgel 1932,  78).   He considered waterpower,  the  so‐called 
“white  coal”  not  only  a  solution,  but  also  an  absolute  necessity  for  Europe,  to  be 
properly developed.   
  New sources of power would be necessary  to  fuel  the expansion  of a growing 
European  population.    In  order  to  accommodate  that  population,  more  Lebensraum 
would have to be found, conquered, or created.  The pacifist Sörgel chose the latter.  He 
 20 
felt  that  adequate  space  for  growth  was  the  only  way  to  ensure  a  bright  future  for 
Europe.  Indeed, he feared that the acquisition of Lebensraum and a sufficient source of 
power would be the only way to avoid Europe’s downfall. 
  Though Sörgel  saw a bright  future  for Europe  in  completion of Atlantropa,  the 
prevalent cultural pessimism of some contemporary thinkers, such as Oswald Spengler, 




Sörgel  states early  in his  first published work on Atlantropa  that  the ultimate “fate of 
[das  abendländische  Kultur]  –  as  that  of  most  others  –  will  be  settled  on  the 
Mediterranean” (Sörgel 1929, 38).  Where others found the soul of their nation, Sörgel 
spoke  of  a  greater,  European  soul.    The  Spenglerian  reference  surfaces  repeatedly 





and  Politics  in  the  Third  Reich  by  asserting,  “there  is  no  such  thing  as  modernity  in 
general.    There are only national  societies, each  of which becomes modern  in  its own 





as  well  as  the  values  of  the  French  Revolution  and  Industrial  Revolution,  Herf 
reexamines  this  theory  and  reconsiders  the  role  of  technology  in  the  post‐Weimar 
period.9    He  coined  the  term  “reactionary  modernism”  to  describe  the  paradoxical 
cultural  tradition  of  the  time  (1).    In  particular,  Herf  uses  this  to  refer  to  the way  in 
which  National  Socialists  married  the  romantic  ideas  of  Volk10  and  Land11  to  the 
utilitarian  augmentation  of  technology  –  technology made  possible  by  Enlightenment 
ideals. 
  Logically, one would assume that any rejection of technology would accompany 
a  rejection of Enlightenment  ideals,  for an acceptance of  reason would also be  in  line 
with the marriage between Enlightenment philosophical and the period’s technological 
pursuits.    Instead,  those  who  Herf  named  reactionary  modernists  simultaneously 
rejected  Enlightenment  reason  while  embracing  technological  advance  (3).    The 
reactionary modernists sought to integrate the technological component of Western  












culture”  with  the  response,  “technology  and  culture”  (2).    Those  advocating  strong 
technical  progress  knew  that,  in  order  to  avoid  stagnation,  they  had  to  embrace 
technology.    They  sought  to  create  a  stählernde Romantik  (steel‐like  Romanticism)  in 
the words of Joseph Goebbels (3).   
  The paradox of German sociological development13 had  its roots  in  its  late, but 
“thorough”  industrialization  as  compared  to  England  and  France  (5).    Ralf  Dahrendorf 
considered  industrialization  a  filter  of  sorts,  through  which  all  societies  pass  before 
approaching  the modern problem of  liberalism  (Dahrendorf 34).    In  the German case, 
the machinations of industry were very quickly adopted from the examples of western 
neighbors, but the societal structure remained largely unchanged (35).  Said Jeffrey Herf 
in  his  preface,  “Germany’s  scientific  and  technological  advances occurred without  the 
benefit  of  a  vital  tradition  of  political  liberalism”  (Herf  ix).    This  combination  of  the 
“inherited  structures  of  the  dynastic  state  of  Prussia” with  rapid  industrialization  left 
little space for political liberalism (Dahrendorf 35), but also accounted for the speed and 
success with which Germany became an  industrial power.   Herein  lies the paradox:   a 
rejection of rational thought despite making use of the fruits born of that same though.  

















Marxism.    The  addition  of  that  nationalistic  third  force  fueled  the  National  Socialist 
movement in Germany, and informed the way in which they detested communists and 
the “capitalist Jews.”  Herf then elaborated on his use of the term “modernist,” saying 
that  they  were  first  and  foremost  technological  modernizers,  advocating  the 
industrialization of Germany.  Secondly, the reactionary modernists “articulated themes 
associated with the modernist vanguard” – a collection of thinkers in the western world 
forming  a  movement  not  associated  with  the  political  Left  or  Right,  but  instead  a 





(11),  and  as  such,  Spengler  warranted  an  entire  chapter  in  Herf’s  Reactionary 
Modernism.14    Spengler’s  most  well  known  work,  Der  Untergang  des  Abendlandes15 






espoused  a  highly  anti‐Zivilisation  rhetoric  that  was  typical  of  critics  of  the  Weimar 
Republic and of the post‐War period.  Herf, however, found another, often overlooked, 
undercurrent  within  Spengler’s  text  –  a  similar  “reconciliation  of  romantic  and 
irrationalist  sentiments  with  enthusiasm  for  technical  advance”  (49)  –  and,  as  such, 
classified him as a typical reactionary modernist, albeit one who “straddled the fence” 
between  a  traditional  Prussian  conservatism  and  the  more  revolutionary  postwar 
conservatives (11). 
  In  Preußentum  und  Sozialismus,  Spengler  made  clear  that  he  disagreed  with 
Marxist  ideas,  on  the  basis  that  Marx  applied  conflicting  societal  customs  onto  his 
theory of class struggle.  He likened the English attitude toward work to that of a Viking 
– focused not upon “patching the sail” but instead only upon capturing the “loot.”  The 
primary  objective  in  wealth  acquisition  was  the  possibility  of  entering  the  ranks  of 
“gentlemen,” and to escape the difficulties of Handarbeit (manual labor) into the realm 
of  Händlergewinn  (mercantile  gain).16    Spengler  argued  that  Marx  took  this  “purely 
English”  dichotomy  and  incorporated  it  into  his  theory  of  the  Bourgeoisie  and 
Proletariat  (Spengler  1920,  73).    This  false  analogy  only  highlighted Marx’s  erroneous 
logic with regard to  labor, argued Spengler, who felt  that the true honor of hard work 
was lost on both Marx and the English.  Had Marx understood the Prussian concept of 
work  –  a  business  of  service  to  the  greater  society  as  a whole,  not  only  in  service  of 
oneself – he would have likely never written his Manifesto (Spengler 1920, 74).   




a  highly  nationalistic  tone  as  Spengler  ridiculed  the  latter,  suggesting  that Marx  had 




state  functioned  as  a whole, where  both worker  and  business  are  fundamentally  and 
equally civil servants.  The principle of civil service to the state “…ist die innere Form der 
politischen Zivilisation des Abendlandes…” (…is the inner form of the civilized politics of 
the  West…).    Moreover,  Spengler  found  symbolic  evidence  of  this  in  the  Gothic 
cathedrals,  where  every  small  detail  is  a  necessary  component  of  a  greater  whole 
(Spengler 1920, 76).   
  As  Herf  noted,  Spengler’s  attack  on  Marx  in  Preußentum  und  Sozialismus 
constituted  a  “metamorphosis  of  philosophical‐political  categories  into  nationalist 
ones.”    Spengler  considered himself modern  in  comparison  to  the  nineteenth century 
(worker  class) materialism.   Marxism was,  to  him,  too  rational  and  unromantic  to be 
considered modern, and Marx’s obsession with the dichotomy between capitalists and 
the  proletariat  was  a  byproduct  of Manchester  liberalism  and  of  his  own  Jewishness 
(Herf  50).    Here,  Spengler  revealed  some  reactionary  tendencies,  saying,  “the  feeling 
that  life dominates reason, … that knowledge of men  is more  important than abstract 
and general ideas.”  ”Knowledge” here does not to refer to advancements won through 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rational  thought  of  the  liberal  Enlightenment  tradition.    Spengler  favored  Prussian 
qualities, such as fate, instinct, and the organic (50‐51).   
  Before  Preußentum  und  Sozialismus,  Spengler  published  his  most  recognized 
work Der Untergang des Abendlandes  in 1918, which contained a sort of philosophical 
reflection  on  world  history.    John  Farrenkopf  called  this  work  “an  unconventional, 
multidisciplinary, and wide‐ranging work on the philosophy of world history,” and noted 
that Spengler sought not only to chronicle the philosophical history of both Western and 
non‐Western  cultures,  but  also  to  create  “a  kind  of  unconventional  textbook  on  the 
philosophy of statecraft.”   Spengler hoped to advance the causes of neo‐conservatism 
and  imperialism  in  light  of  democratic  and  capitalist  developments  of  the  Weimar 
Republic  and  Western  Europe  (Farrenkopf  20‐21).    In  the  first  volume  of  his  work, 
Spengler  defined  and  contrasted  two  competitive  perspectives  on  understanding: 






  Der  Untergang  des  Abendlandes,  with  its  relative  popularity  in  Germany, 
expanded  dialog  with  regard  to  historical  depictions,  in  that  it  provided  a  non‐






cultures  the  same  indicators  of  life  as  with  organisms  (30).    Each  civilization  displays 
ascertainable  stages  of  “childhood,  youth,  manhood,  and  old  age”  (Spengler,  qtd.  in 
Farrenkopf 30).  This idea that civilizations have life cycles necessarily implies that there 
must  also  be  a  death,  or,  at  the very  least,  a  decline  into  obscurity.    Spengler’s  great 
concern  for  western  civilization,  his  Abendländische  Kultur,  hinged  upon  this  axis  of 
thought,  and  because  of  the  natural  and  organic  order  of  history,  he  saw  no  route 
through which such a fate could be avoided (Spiering and Wintle 191). 
  Though Herf finds Spengler’s judgments about the impending decline of western 
civilization  “dubious,”  he  credits  Spengler  with  influencing  a  “mood  of  impending 
disaster and possible  salvation”  in  the postwar Weimar period.    The  story depicted  in 
Der  Untergang  des  Abendlandes  is  constructed  upon  a  so‐called  “morphological” 
perspective – a romantic notion that the typical mechanizations of modern civilization 





  Sörgel  exemplified  many  modernist  tendencies  as  well  as  some  of  the 







economics,  and  politics.    He made  a  case  for  the  use  of  technology,  saying  “Nicht  im 
Kampfe gegen die Maschine, sondern nur im Bunde mit ihr kommen wir weiter.” (Not in 
fighting the machine, but  instead only  in  league with  it, do we advance)  (Sörgel 1932, 
85).    The  faith  that  Sörgel  placed  in  Europe’s  technological  abilities  is  inherent  in  the 
Atlantropa  plan  and  underscored  by  the  fact  that  he envisioned  a  completed  dam at 
Gibraltar in a mere ten years time (Gall, 24).  Contrasting the breathtakingly brief period 
of  time  envisioned  for  the  completion  of  the  Gibraltarwerk,18    Sörgel  proposed  an 
exceedingly long‐term vision for Atlantropa’s completion, coming only after the passage 
of  two  hundred  fifty  years  (Sörgel  1932,  24).    So  great  was  his  faith,  that  he  did  not 
bother  to address  some of  the difficulties  regarding  the Tunisdamm,  trusting  that  the 
technology would naturally be available by that  time (32‐33).    In his own texts, Sörgel 
remained  deliberately  vague  about  important  details  and  numbers  involved  in  the 
project, choosing instead to rely upon sketches or the expertise of specialists (Gall, 27).  
In this respect, he appeared blind to legitimate obstacles, as well as sociopolitical forces, 
at  least  because  of  an  obsession  with  technical  and  mechanical  potential,  and  an 
increasing  fixation  upon  the  looming  specters  of  Asia  and  America,  as  will  become 
evident below.  
                                                
18 This term refers to the dam and hydroelectric works at Gibraltar, as a whole. 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 Much more difficult  to pinpoint are Sörgel’s  reactionary  tendencies.   He was a 
self‐proclaimed  pacifist,  and  detested  the  idea  of  using  military  might  to  advance 






precedence  over  other  economic  considerations.    Atlantropa  was  not  fundamentally 
meant to be a moneymaking venture, but was merely to ensure the stability of Europe 
and  her  markets.    This  mindset  aligns  with  the  anti‐capitalist,  culture‐focused  neo‐
romantics  of  the  Weimar  period,  who  certainly  embraced  the  doom‐and‐gloom 
predictions  of  Spengler.    The  same  prognoses  of  decline  informed  Sörgel’s  verdict: 
“Entweder:  Untergang  des  Abendlandes  Oder:  Atlantropa  als Wende  und  neues  Ziel” 
(Either: Decline  of Western  Civilization  Or: Atlantropa  as  turning  point  and  new  goal) 








publications  before  the  end  of World War  II.  The  Spenglerian  school  of  thought was, 
however,  not  the  only  important  contributor  to  Sörgel’s  design.    The  popular 
apprehension  of  Europe’s  demise  promulgated  by  Oswald  Spengler  and  the  empire 
building of the  late 19th and early 20th centuries  coalesced and gave birth, not only to 
Atlantropa, but also to a number of conceptions of a future Europe.   
  Alexander Gall  notes  in  his  book, Das Atlantropa‐Projekt,  that  Europe  saw not 
only a powerful new wave of nationalism at the end of the First World War, but also an 








Africa must  be  consolidated  into  one  unit  in  a  section  entitled  “What  is  the  political 
importance of this project for the world?”  He advocated creating Atlantropa, not solely 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as  an  essential  political  and  economic  fix  for  an  ailing  Europe,  but  additionally  as  a 
bulwark  against  a  “threatened  external  destruction  between  and  from  the  hands  of 
America and Asia” (Sörgel 1929, 38).  Later in 1932, he elaborated on his perception of 
these external threats, explaining that America had no need for colonies because of its 
inherited wealth  in  natural  resources,  industrial  capacity,  and  land  in every  [climactic] 
zone of  the  Earth.   America would be autarchic  (Sörgel 1932, 79).   Asia, on  the other 
hand, would  be  a  threat  to das Abendland  because  of  the  “racial  antipathy”  of  India, 




improve  upon  them.    He  first  considered Woytinsky’s  proposed  “Vereinigte  Staaten,” 
and quickly dismissed  it as an  improbability.   Sörgel  found the East to West  format of 
Woytinsky’s idea unsustainable because of the aforementioned antipathy between the 
“Asian  and  European  races.”    He  maintained  that,  even  if  a  European  were  to  live 














his  own  personal  crusade  to  assemble  the  separate  nation  states  of  Europe  into 
“Paneuropa.”20  Not unlike Herman Sörgel, Coudenhove‐Kalergi took note of the rapidly 
evolving political landscape of Europe (and the greater world) in the period between the 
two  World  Wars.    He  saw  the  Interwar  period  as  a  battle  between  pessimists  and 
optimists, between those who promulgated nationalistic competition between nations 
and  peoples  and  those  who  invested  their  hopes  for  the  future  in  rationality  and 
thoughts  of  peace  (Coudenhove‐Kalergi  56).    Before  the  League  of  Nations  began  to 
“heal the wounds” of the First World War, its mandate was severely diminished by the 
American  Senate’s  declination  to  join  the  union.    Without  the  initial  support  of  the 
Americans or the Soviets, the League was rendered impotent and could no longer claim 











the plausibility of a peacekeeping union  in Europe.   Coudenhove‐Kalergi, however,  felt 
that  history  provided  ample  precedent  for  the  viability  of  such  a  conglomeration  of 
states.    In  a  chapter  entitled  “Geschichte  der  Paneuropa‐Bewegung”  (History  of  the 
Paneuropa Movement), Coudenhove‐Kalergi began by crediting the Greeks as the first 
to have divided their known world into three separate wholes – Asia, Europe, and Africa 
–  and  created  the  concept  of  the  European  continent.    The  Roman  Empire,  he 
continued, was a Mediterranean empire, but  laid  the basic groundwork  for a  “second 
Europe” – one that was united through a common language (Latin) and through religion 
(the  Catholic  Church).    During  the  Crusades,  the  common enemy of  this  newly  arisen 
Abendland was Islam, but the efforts of the Europeans failed ultimately, due to a lack of 
cohesive  unity  among  princes,  states,  and  cities,  who  continued  to  quarrel  with  one 
another  despite  the  efforts  in  the  Near  East  (52‐53).    In  light  of  these  events,  two 
contrasting figures came to develop some of the first, albeit disparate, ideals of uniting 
Europe in the early fourteenth century.  Coudenhove‐Kalergi held that the Italian poet, 
Dante  Alighieri,  and  French  politician  Pierre  Dubois  with  the  original  conception  of  a 




despite  advances  made  by  the  Turks  in  Southeastern  Europe  in  the  fifteenth  and 
Napoleon’s  expansionist  conquests  in  the  early  nineteenth  centuries.    The  goal  was 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made  more  challenging  because  of  the  Reformation  and  the  spiritual  split  that 
afterwards ensued (54‐55).   
  Only in the aftermath of World War I, with a measure of desperation in the face 




Weltwunder”  (European  world  wonder)  acquired  Coudenhove‐Kalergi’s  interest  and 
respect because of the sovereignty that each of  its Kantons retained under the federal 
law within the Swiss nation (39‐40).  He also found remarkable the cultural plurality that 
not  only  existed  in  Switzerland,  but  which  was  also  advocated  by  the  federal 
government.    Such  cultural  development  is  most  obvious  when  considering  the 
languages  spoken  within  Switzerland.    Coudenhove‐Kalergi  chose  Switzerland  as  an 
archetype with  critical  awareness  of  the  nationalism brewing  in  the  rest  of  Europe  in 





design of Pan‐America,  if necessary by calling a  conference of the affected states.   An 
important  second  step would  be  the  canceling  of  obligatory  separation  treatises  and 






europäische  Seele  ist  dreidimensional:  christlich  die  Tiefe,  hellenisch  die  Weite, 
germanisch  die  Höhe.”  (The  European  soul  is  three  dimensional:  Christian  the  depth, 







to  be  in  line with  his  own  expectations  of  Atlantropa,  going  so  far  as  to  call  the  two 
projects  “brothers”  and  “confederates.”    In  order  to  distinguish  the  two propositions, 
however,  Sörgel  sought  to  differentiate  them  in  his  1932  publication,  stating  that 
although the goals and outcomes of both unions were similar, the primary dissimilarities 
lie  in  the genesis of each project.    Sörgel  said of  the  two,  “Paneuropa  is  the  idea of a 
philosophizing  politician,  Atlantropa  the  idea  of  an  organized  technician.”    Sörgel 
revealed  once  more  his  pessimism  in  contrast  to  Coudenhove‐Kalergi’s  perceived 
optimism  in  his  elaboration  on  the  two  proposals.    The  successful  implementation  of 
Paneuropa  would  rely  on  “victorious  reason”  and  healthy  common  sense  within 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European  politics.    Sörgel  immediately  answered  with  his  typical  pessimistic 
dichotomization:    “entweder  Untergang  oder  Verständigung”  (Either  decline  or 
understanding).  Europe would  only  be  united when  its  people  finally  understood  the 
desperation of their situation (Sörgel 1932, 82).    
  Sörgel  wished  to  make  another  distinction  between  Paneuropa  and  his 





to  work.    In  a  sense,  Sörgel  here  justified  the  fantastic  proportions  of  his  project, 
because  of  his  belief  that  engineering  and  technology  should  lead  to  a  unification  of 
Europe  through  the  material  work  involved  in  such  a  project  (82‐83).    Political  unity 
would  be  a  logical,  if  not  necessary,  consequence  of  the  work  involved  in  creating 
Atlantropa.   An Atlantropa headquarters  in Geneva would  foster  that unity: unity  in a 
political,  economic,  and  technological  sense,  represented  by  the  three  towers  of  the 
Atlantropahaus.   
  A  common  feature  of  Sörgel’s  rhetoric  and  that  of  both  the  conservatives  and 
National  Socialists  in  the  early  twentieth  century  was  the  use  of  the  concept  of 
Lebensraum to advance albeit very differing campaigns.  The overpopulation of Europe 
had  become  a  concern  since  the  onset  of  the  Industrial  Revolution,  with  many 
prominent  thinkers  such  as  Thomas  Malthus  warning  of  the  potential  dangers  of 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population  to  the  well  being  of  society.21    Sörgel  reduced  the  “vitally  important” 
symptoms  plaguing  the  “politico‐economic  body  of  Europe”  to  three  basic  factors  – 
Lebensraum,  Bevölkerung,  and  Energiewirtschaft  (Technik).    He  provided  a  graphic 
representation of the three factors and their interaction (see Figure 5 below) (95).  In his 
estimation,  the events of  the First World War were  the natural  consequence of  these 
three  factors  –  the  “kettle”  of  European  Lebensraum  simply  could  not withstand  the 

















Lebensraum.    Sörgel answered  the Lebensraumfrage  clearly and definitively by  stating 







  to  increasingly  threatening  dangers.    Europe,  the most mechanized  land of  the  Earth, 









  Though many of  the German states had acquired  some small  colonial  holdings 
prior  to  unification  in  1871,  the  unified  German  empire  needed  to  close  an  ever‐
widening  gap  between  its  own  colonial  program  and  those  of  the  other  European 
nations.    Compounding  the  issue  was  a  seeming  lack  of  initial  interest  in  developing 
holdings  overseas  in  leaders  such  as  Bismarck,  despite  a  broad  belief  amongst  the 
population  that  a  well‐developed  colonial  empire  would  officially  signal  Germany’s 
arrival  on  the world  stage  (Schinzinger  22‐23).    The  reach  for  colonies went  hand‐in‐
hand with the desired development of a powerful overseas economy that could rival the 
British (23).   
  Despite  the  greater  public  interest  in  the  prospect,  Bismarck  only  grudgingly 
gave into the demands for a colonial empire, citing a need for the domestic economy in 
Germany to remain competitive with rivals Britain and France.  Between the 1880s and 
the  outset  of  World  War  I,  the  empire  established  colonies  in  the  Pacific  (Deutsch 
Neuguinea)  and several  in Africa as well – Togoland, Kamerun, Deutsch Ostafrika, and 
Deutsch Südwestafrika.22 
  Given  the  frustration  in Germany due  to  the  loss  of  its  colonies  after  the  First 
World  War,  and  the  expansive  holdings  that  Britain  and  France  maintained,  many 






official  by  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  in  1919,  an  awareness  of  colonial  affairs  continued 
through the Weimar Republic and World War  II.   Even after the German defeat  in the 
latter war, with Germany divided amongst the victorious Allies, there continued to be an 
interest in the other European colonies and their activities in the well‐informed German 
populace.     Monika Albrecht notes  in her essay, “German Debates on Colonialism and 
Decolonization  in  the Post‐War Era,”  that  there was no “post‐colonial  amnesia,” even 
after the Second World War.  She references many articles from Der Spiegel in the post‐
war era that attested to journalists’ historical knowledge of German colonialism.  Pains 
were  taken  to  make  the  reader  aware  of  many  colonies’  former  German  patronage, 









about  by  comparing  the  mechanized  North  with  the  “jungfräulich”  (virginal)  South 
(Sörgel 1932, 103) implied not just a continuing rape of African lands, but moreover one 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25).    While  some  provisions  of  the  Atlantropa  project  certainly  implied  substantial 
benefits  for  the African  continent  and  peoples,  there was  little  to  nothing  to  suggest 
that  there were any altruistic notions  regarding  the betterment of  the African people 
and  their  living  conditions.    Any  development  would  have  been  based  upon  purely 
European interests.  
  Sörgel’s Atlantropa differed from traditional  imperialistic ambitions  in  its, albeit 
loosely  defined,  supranational  focus.    Forgoing  the  designation  of  particular  national 
gains  in  the  new  continent,  Sörgel  focused  on  Atlantropa’s  dividends  for  the 
Abendländische Kultur as a whole – acquisitions for the greater European Volk.  Despite 
the lofty, nearly utopian language that Sörgel used to describe his new continent, there 
existed  no  concurrent  vision  of  a  future  in which  race  relations were  somehow  to  be 









ohne Bild”  (frame without a picture),  and as  the “jungfräulich, unbeschriebenes Blatt” 
(virginal, unwritten page) of the Earth (Sörgel 1932, 126; Sörgel 1938, 57).  There would 
be no problem of miscegenation between the black workers and their white, European 
entrepreneurial  bosses  (Sörgel  1938,  56).    This  ideology,  incredibly  racist  in  nature,  is 
made  poignantly  clear  through  Sörgel’s  constant  mention  of  the  “yellow  peril”  and 
simultaneous disregard  for  the African cultures.    To  imperialists and Sörgel,  there was 
no  culture  to  fear  in  Africa,  and  hence  no  impediment  to  European  control  over  the 
continent.  He summed up this point quite neatly, declaring: “Amerika den Amerikanern 
–  Atlantropa  den  Europäern  –  Asien  den  Asiaten!”  (America  for  the  Americans  – 
Atlantropa for the Europeans – Asia for the Asians!) (Sörgel 1932, 115).    
  In an effort to make his project more palatable to the National Socialist regime, 
many  of  whom  were  skeptical  of  Atlantropa,  Sörgel  published Die  Drei  Großen  A  in 
1938. Sörgel had been granted permission by Hitler’s office in 1935 to publish work on 









the  1938  work  in  a  cunning  manner,  likely  designed  to  catch  the  eye  of  National 
Socialists  or  Fascists.    One  chapter  was  subtitled  “Achse  Berlin‐Rom  bis  Kapstadt 













Some of  the aforementioned chapter  titles and  subsection  titles,  though having made 
clear allusions to common Nazi jargon, were then followed by text that lacked the same 
fervor.    Opening  with  a  quote  from  Adolf  Hitler’s Mein  Kampf,23  Sörgel  presented 
Atlantropa as a project championed by the “pillar” of Greater Germany and the Italian 
Empire, as is suggested in the book’s subtitle.24 Though quoting Hitler was no doubt an 
overture  to  the  men  in  power,  Sörgel  wasted  no  time  in  contradicting  the  National 
Socialist agenda in his own introduction to the book, saying, 
  Wenn  es  eine  Idee  gäbe,  die  höher  und  stärker  wäre,  als  der  Haß  und  Neid  in  der 
  europäischen Völkerfamilie,  eine  Idee, die mit Hilfe der Technik  eine breite Grundlage 
  zu  einem  neuen  Leben  der  Völker  schaffen  würde:  könnte  man  dann  nicht  durch 
  ungeheuren  Ländergewinn,  vor  allem  aber  durch  die  noch  größere  Aufgabe  und 
  gemeinsame  Arbeit  die  Gefahr  des  Krieges  und  des  Unterganges  unserer  Kultur 
  abwenden?    ...  Eine  Friedensarbeit  so  groß,  daß  kein  Krieg  Energien  findet,  durch 
  die Mittel  der modernen und  zukünftigen  Technik,  welche die Völker  naturnotwendig 
  und zwangsläufig verbindet!   












  (If there were an  idea, which were greater and stronger  than the hate and envy in the 
  European cultural  family, an  idea,  that with  the assistance of  technology would create 
  the foundation to a new life of the people: could one not then, through enormous land 
  gains, and above all through the larger task and collective work, avert the threat of war 
  and  the decline of our culture? … A work of peace so great,  that war  finds no energy, 
  through  the  apparatus  of  modern  and  future  technology,  which  binds  the  peoples 
  through natural necessity and inescapability.) (8). 
This  sort  of peaceful enterprise and  cooperation among European  states  contradicted 
the Nazi’s own plans to forcefully annex territory (Voigt, 106).  Sörgel attempted to sway 
far right elements with a change  in tone and rhetoric, but did not change the heart of 
the  plan, which  required  cooperation.    Despite a  concurrent  desire  to  regain  colonies 
lost  to  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  and  the  opportunity  offered  by  Sörgel,  the  regime 
prioritized annexing Lebensraum for the German people in the East.  Sörgel and many of 
his  supporters  ultimately  remained  opposed  to  the Kriegs‐  und  Ost‐orientierte  Politik 
(Politics of war and eastern‐oriented politics) of  the NS  regime, and as a  result, never 
gained much ground with the fascist government.   











nature  of  the  plan,  Herman  Sörgel  managed  to  amass  quite  a  following  of  loyal 
supporters.    Most  of  these  men  and  women  were  fellow  pacifists,  who  favored  a 
peaceful solution to Europe’s perceived problems and found mutual understanding in a 
technocratic  vision of  the  future.    Though personal  interest  in  his  concept waxed and 
waned  amongst  the  greater  populace,  some  of  his  followers  actively  promoted  his 
brainchild as if it were their own.  Sörgel worked with a small army of engineers, mostly 
from Germany, Austria, and Switzerland – as well as with artists – most notably Heinrich 
Kley,  who  provided  numerous  visual  representations  of  his  unrealized  dream  (Sörgel 
1932,  VII‐VIII).    Beyond  the  more  practical  development  of  engineering  schematics, 
there  were  creative  individuals  who  brought  Sörgel’s  world  to  life  through  their 
published  stories.   Novels making manifest a world  to  come enjoyed popularity  in  the 




















original name of  the project,  and Sörgel himself wrote an  introduction  to  the book  in 
October of 1930.  
  Güntsche’s  novel  details  the  socio‐political  situation  of  a  drastically  different 
world  in the year 1970.  In the aftermath of World War I, Anglo‐American competition 





















for  the  project.    It  is  no  coincidence  that  Mao‐Ssai  is  so  amenable  to  the  idea  of 
cooperating with the European Union – he himself being the son of a German and an 
African  queen.    In  addition,  he  has  fallen  in  love  with  Adelgart,  the  daughter  of  a 
powerful German industry leader, Geheimrat Verschüren. 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 With  the  support  of  the African mogul,  construction  begins.    Despite  constant 
attempts  by  American  and  Asian  agents  to  sabotage  construction  and  an  incident 
involving  the  bribery  of  British  guards  to  ignore  a  bombing  plot,  the  construction  is 
successfully executed.  Only four years after initiation, the dam at Gibraltar is completed 
in 1974, and the world gazes in awe at the spectacle of a shrinking Mediterranean.  The 





this  contrast  in  his  essay  “Engineering  Europe:  The  European  Idea  in  Interbellum 
Literature, The Case of Panropa.”  Though there can be no conclusive determination of 
how  Sörgel  felt  about  Güntsche’s  end  product,  Spiering  aptly  assumes  that  the 
“suggestion  that  black  and  white  might  intermarry  must  have  dismayed  Sörgel” 
(Spiering  and  Wintle  188‐189).    The  African  president  Mao‐Ssai  is  presented  as 
essentially  European,  not  because  of  blood,  but  instead  because  of  acculturation.  
Adelgart’s  sister,  Hella,  is  the  voice  of  “progress”  in  the  novel,  calling Mao‐Ssai  “ein 
weißer  Neger”  (a  white  negro),  inferring  that  he  is  the  equal  of  the  European  white 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races  (Güntsche  33).    This  progressive  depiction  of  the  future  was  not  lost  on  the 
National Socialists, who condemned Panropa.  Their newspaper, Völkischer Beobachter, 
condemned  the  novel,  calling  it  a  “Zionist  ‘Völkervermischungsprojekt’”  (race‐mixing 
project)  (Voigt  112).    Though  Panropa  may  not  have  been  well‐received  by  the  NS 
regime, Sörgel himself maintained his line that Africans were far inferior to Europeans, 









  In  Well’s  account,  the  “yellow”  peril  is  replaced  with  the  “red”  peril  –  giving 
credence  to  the  rise  of  the  Soviet  Bloc  and  their  influence  to  Europe’s  east.  
Furthermore, many of the residents along the Mediterranean coast protest what would 
ultimately be the destruction of their homes.  The difficulties overcoming the objections 
of  this  population  gave  a  nod  to  some of Herman  Sörgel’s  own difficulties  convincing 
some countries – most notably  Italy – to come on board with his plan.   Once again, a 
German engineer, Kai Manner, spearheads the push for Atlantropa.  The primary driving 




positively  for  the  proponents  of  Atlantropa.    The  novel  ends  with  an  all‐too‐familiar 
rallying  cry  first  envisioned  by  Herman  Sörgel:  “Zwei  Erdteile  haben  einen  dritten 
geboren” (Two continents have born a third) (Wells 270).   
  Spiering notes that the implementation of such a mega‐project did not seem as 




the  Dawvydow  Canal  system  in  the  Soviet  Union,  which would  have  seen  a  series  of 




  Georg  Güntsche’s  Panropa  and  J.  E.  Wells’  Projekt  Atlantropa  both  fictionally 
chronicle the fulfillment of Herman Sörgel’s personal quest to oversee the  lowering of 
the Mediterranean through damming.  The engineers in both novels so closely resemble 
the  actual  Herman  Sörgel  that  one  can  refer  to  Maurus,  Manner,  or  Sörgel 
interchangeably in the discourse on Atlantropa.  Both novels present this narrative in an 







can  draw  many  conclusions  about  Sörgel  and  his  personal  perspective  through  her 
analysis of these fictional works.  In her work, Brandt first delineates the characteristics 
constituting a Zukunftsroman as such: 







which  it  was  published.    The  plot  must  however  present:    technical  and/or  political 




of  autarky  –  especially  in  the  sense  of  obtaining  new  resources.    In  particular,  she 




high  incidence  of  what  she  calls  “engineering  fantasies.”    These  Ingenieurphantasien 
(engineer’s  fantasies,  or  engineering  fantasies)  stand  in  contrast  to  other  novels  that 
focus  primarily  on  Völkerbund‐  or  Weltkriegsszenarios  (International  alliance/league 
scenarios or world war scenarios), in that the significant driving force of the narrative is 
placed  upon  the  project  itself.    Other  considerations  –  political,  social,  or  economic 
events  or  repercussions  –  are  secondary  (104).    The  engineer  has  no  direct  personal 
interest in changing the political landscape.  He does not set out to create any union of 
states.    Instead,  he  only  interested  in  presenting  to  the world  the  possibilities made 
available to it by the realization of his concept.  In Völkerbund‐ and Weltkriegsszenarios, 
there  exists  instead  an  explicit  desire  to  affect  political  and  social  change,  often  as  a 
result of  technical achievement.   The technical details are then, however, downplayed 
(105).   
  Though  Brandt  categorizes  Herman  Sörgel’s  Atlantropaprojekt  and  the  novels 
fictionalizing  its  construction  as  Ingenieurphantasien  (81),  there  is  an  argument  to  be 
made  that  they combine both engineer’s  fantasies with the “union”  literature.    Sörgel 
presented Atlantropa as the engineer’s solution to the decline of European culture and 
distanced himself from “politically motivated” solutions like that of Coudenhove‐Kalergi, 







  Another  commonality  of  the  Zukunftsroman  is  the  presence  of  a  technocratic 
hero.    This  figure,  according  to  Brandt,  is  simultaneously  secretive  and  ingenious, 
suddenly coming to the forefront of society to present a new “super weapon” to combat 
the ails of the nation.  In the pursuit of his goal, he is autocratic and virtually dictatorial – 
showing  a  nearly  “Hitler‐like  mentality”  –  in  his  actions.    She  notes  also  that  the 
engineer  hero  desires  no  political  power  or  capital,  beyond what  is  necessary  for  the 





the  project  –  the  effects  and  results  of  the  Großprojekt  alone  stand  as  reason  and 
propaganda enough (236).  Sörgel, by contrast, openly sought to inform the public about 
his  plan  from  the  onset.    He  published  his  first  volume  describing  Atlantropa  in  four 
languages with the intention of reaching and convincing as many in the European public 
as possible.  Where Brandt’s heroes might only openly advertise their projects in order 
to  gain  financial  support,  Sörgel  and  his  fictional  incarnations,  Maurus  and  Manner, 
were quite open to the public, seizing any opportunity for discussion.   
  Brandt directly addresses Atlantropa and Georg Güntsche’s Panropa in her work 
as  archetypal  of German  Zukunftsromane.    Though  the  project  and  its  fictionalization 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both share many of the motifs that are common to these novels, there is a strong case 






  Herman Sörgel’s Atlantropa project, despite  its  breathtaking expanse,  is  nearly 
forgotten.    It  remains  little more than a flash point  in some of Western society’s most 
sordid years.   Though  it  is not alone  in this  regard,  it certainly was unique  in terms of 
scale.  Atlantropa belonged to another era – an era in which technocratic Großprojekte 
were the answer to desperate tribulations in the form of wars and social strife.  Despite 
some brief mention  in  several  science  fiction books and  stories  in  the early  twentieth 





literally, build a new continent, especially a quest  that never  came anywhere close  to 
commencement, much  less  fruition.   At surface  level, Atlantropa holds  little  relevance 
for  our  world  today  as  a  solution  to  the  energy,  environmental,  social,  and  political 
problems  that  we  (still)  face.    It  goes  without  saying  that  the  environmental 
consequences of fundamentally altering the face of our planet would be nothing short 
of  devastating  –  though  such  environmental  balances  were  not  fully  understood  in 
Sörgel’s  time.    In  cases  where  those  consequences  were  apparent,  they  might  have 




simply  been  ignored.    Beyond  this most  obvious  environmental  issue  lie  questions  of 








the  general  failure  of  the  project  to  ever  get  off  the  ground,  despite  any  brief 
excitement  of  the  public  about  the  proposal.    Although  numerous  megaproject 
proposals filled the pages of newspapers and the literature of the post‐World War I time 
period  around  the world,  very  few were  brought  to  fruition.    Prominent  examples  of 
megaprojects  actually  realized  might  be  the  Panama  Canal,  the  Tennessee  Valley 
Authority,  or  the  Channel  Tunnel.    Nonetheless,  these  projects  very  obviously  pale  in 
comparison to something of the magnitude that Herman Sörgel proposed – altering the 
very  physical  composition  and  appearance  of  the  Earth.    Perhaps  Atlantropa merits 
closer examination based solely on its curious nature as a monumental undertaking. 






natural  tendency  to  “label”  historical  figures,  Atlantropa  begs  closer,  more  thorough 
inspection of differing mindsets. 
  Could  one  consider  Herman  Sörgel  a  reactionary  modernist?    Sörgel  certainly 
embraced  the  cultural  pessimism  that  engulfed  Europe  in  the  aftermath  of  the  First 
World War.  A well‐read man, Sörgel adopted Spenglerian terminology and promulgated 




the  Spenglerian  notion  that  nothing  could  be  done  to  deter  the  fate  of  a  declining 
civilization.  He turned to technology for salvation from this fate.  




developing  into  three  enormous  superpowers,  with  Europe  and  Africa  necessarily 
coming together to prevent domination from American and Asian aggressors.   Though 
these three blocs were not imperialistic in a traditional sense, his plan for Europeans to 
colonize  Africa  was  certainly  reminiscent  of  the  way  in  which  the  imperial  powers 




difficult  to pinpoint.   Dr. Otto Maurus and Kai Manner, main  characters  in  two novels 
depicting  the  successful  implementation  of  Atlantropa‐like  projects,  exhibit  nearly  all 
qualities typical of heroes of the genre.   Their multi‐faceted natures and willing use of 
propaganda  (reflecting  that  of  Sörgel)  contradict  still  the  normal  mode  of  most 
Ingenieurhelden.   Moreover, Sörgel’s  introduction to Güntsche’s book suggests that he 
had a hand in steering any offshoots of his idea.  Though not a boisterous person, Sörgel 
displayed  both  a  “fast  scheuen  Innigkeit”  (almost  shy  intensity)  as  well  as    “eiserner 
Entschlossenheit”  (iron  determination)  in  interviews  with  the  press  (Münchener 
Staatszeitung  qtd.  in  Voigt  15).    Indeed,  the  depiction  of  the  project  and  its 
straightforward and necessary political implications defy the notion that engineers kept 
a hands‐off attitude  toward politics.   Atlantropa’s  champions explicitly  sought political 
union.   





forward.    In  that  effort,  a  myriad  of  social  and  political  movements  emerged,  each 
featuring  ideological  dogmas.  Oswald  Spengler’s  pessimism  served  as  inspiration  for 
many of  the  tactics used by  fascist  regimes.   With Hitler and  the Nazi  regime’s  rise  to 
power,  the  impact  of  pacifist  proposals  for  union  in  Europe were  heavily  diminished. 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Still,  the  events  of  the  Second World War  do  not  lessen  the  historical  significance  of 
proposals and campaigns  that  counteracted  reactionary  policy.    The  legacy of Richard 





Sörgel  and  his  beloved  Atlantropa  manifested  qualities  belonging  to  many  differing 
political ideologies.  Sörgel was a racist pacifist seeking to build an empire‐like union of 
nations  in  order  to  overcome  the  nearly  inevitable  impending  decline  of  Western 
civilization  through  technological prowess.   Herman Sörgel promoted  the construction 
of the single largest project ever conceived.  He did so earnestly and without any doubt 
in his cause or  in man’s technological  capabilities.   Herman Sörgel  tasked himself with 
engineering  society.    He  failed.    Today,  Atlantropa  exists  as  a  blip  on  the  radar  of 
Western history.    The  impetus and motivation behind  this project, however,  inspire a 
most intriguing glimpse of an already fascinating time in history. 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Figure 9: Construction of the Gibraltarwerk; Picture by Heinrich Kley, 1932 
Wolfgang Voigt, Atlantropa: Weltbauen am Mittelmeer ; Ein Architektentraum der Moderne. Hamburg: 2007. 119. Print. 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